logy and blood transfusion, 20 microbiology, 7 morbid anatomy, and 20 in other employment (domestic, secretarial, &c.) .
The definitive survey of 1970 provided the total numbers of staff of various grades and disciplines in responding laboratories and allowed attack rates to be calculated (Table 1) . Except for the small number of science microbiologists (1/128= 0.78%), the highest rate, four times the overall rate, was in biochemistry technicians (7/1438= 0.49 %), of whom 3 had been tested for Au/SH antigen with positive results. Of the few laboratories in which hepatitis was reported, higher proportions had tested specimens from haemodialysis, transplantation and hemophilia units, but this was not true for those testing drug addiction specimens and was doubtful for those testing for Au/SH antigen (Table 2 ). There were no such differences in relation to whether 'high risk' speci- mens were tested by the general staff or by special unit staff, or were not accepted, or whether they were tested on designated mechanized apparatus (5 laboratories only, none with hepatitis), on mechanized apparatus in general use, or were not tested on mechanized apparatus. Analysis of 1971 data is not complete, but the preliminary findings (Table 3 ) show a remarkable difference in that no cases were recorded for biochemistry technicians. This suggests better awareness, technique, equipment and/or organization in this group. The illnesses reported were mild, none fatal, most not treated in hospital. Analysis by the results of testing for Au/SH antigen did not affect the limited interpretation, but this may be more informative during the next year of the investigation as the proportion of cases tested increases. *abbreviations and terminology as in Table 1 It is difficult to relate the attack-rates observed to the experience of the general population, but it may be noted that of over 100 Au/SH antigen positive cases recently recorded in Scotland less than 3 % were relevant infections of laboratory workers (Ross et al. 1972; Reid 1972, personal communication, data of Communicable Diseases, Scotland Unit). We propose to continue the survey for at least one more year in order to obtain bigger figures for analysis and to confirm the apparent trends. 
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Hazards in Blood Transfusion
In the field of blood transfusion our thinking has been, until recently, dominated by the need to minimize the risk of transmitting hepatitis from donors to patients. In so doing we have increased the hazard to staff in blood transfusion centres by introducing a test for Australia antigen and antibody on every donation of blood. For control purposes and to exclude carriers of Au antibody, it is necessary to identify, standardize and use routinely known Au antigen harvested from our own carrier donors. While directors of transfusion centres may have left such tests to experienced virologists, the need to exclude the Au antigen in fresh blood and fresh blood products has dictated the need to perform the tests in transfusion centres. Taking guidance from the Report of the Advisory Group chaired by Maycock (1972), each centre has designed a virology laboratory suitable for these tests and intended to minimize the risk to the staff.
It is now known that approximately one in a thousand blood samples taken from donors carries the Au antigen so that the average blood transfusion centre handles 2 or 3 infected samples from donors every week. Staff employed in trans-fusion centres have always been prone to contamination of their hands with donor blood; in the bottle washing departments, where used equipment is reprocessed, the risk has been highest as also has been the risk of pricking the skin with contaminated needles (10 to 20 times per day per person). One would, therefore, anticipate a high incidence of homologous serum jaundice, of Au antigen carriers or perhaps a high incidence of resistant antibody carriers. The facts are very different.
In the author's laboratory, which is a typical regional blood transfusion centre, not one carrier of antigen or antibody has been found amongst staff exposed to these risks. During a seventeenyear period the centre has employed a total of 1043 people and the present day establishment is 216. During the time quoted, only one case of jaundice has been reported and that was in a junior technician where the history was suggestive of infectious hepatitis and in whom neither Au antigen nor antibody can be detected today.
According to Dr W d'A Maycock (personal communication) there have been 42 cases of jaundice reported from all blood transfusion centres in England and Wales in the period 1951-71. It is not known how many people have been employed totally during that time, but the present establishment of all centres is 2000-2500 people.
In view of experience in blood transfusion centres it is probable that the high incidence of hepatitis in staff working in renal dialysis units is related to a more dangerous form of the hepatitis antigen carried in the blood of patients with renal failure.
Reports from expert committees (see references) have been of great value in high-lighting dangers in laboratories and have been instrumental in raising the standards of personal hygiene. However, where the blood transfusion laboratory is concerned, there is a real danger of lowering the standards of blood group serology by insisting on technicians wearing impractical clothing and practising unfamiliar and cumbersome techniques. If it is intended that such measures are to be restricted to the handling of high risk material only, this fact should be clarified and a better definition is required of 'high risk samples'.
Much more attention must be paid to the packing and transport of blood samples as a high percentage received at reference laboratories still leak and soil accompanying letters. It is not always possible to reject leaky samples as suggested in the Rosenheim Report (1972) -many are for urgent cross-match tests and others are unrepeatable such as those from the umbilical cords of newborn infants. Certain laboratory hazards such as mouth pipetting and aerosols from centrifuges are now well publicized. In the blood transfusion (hamatology) laboratory a less well known but highly potent source of aerosol is the simple Pasteur pipette which causes widespread dissemination of fine droplets during rinsing operations. It is sometimes possible to replace the Pasteur pipette by installing a fully automated procedure. However, when blood grouping is automated one should beware of the daily output of about 20 yards (18 m) of filter paper studded with contaminated effluent in the form of blood tests. These dry off in the air and may well be a source of contamination of the laboratory environment. With the advent of centralization many more of these machines could be operating in future hematology laboratories.
Dr G A Gresham
(Addenbrooke's Hospital, Cambridge) Hepatitis in the Post-mortem Room Most body fluids, in particular blood, may contain vast amounts of hepatitis agent.
Post-mortem room practices leave much to be desired and the post-mortem room is still a hazardous place where hepatitis and tuberculosis are major dangers.
Corpses come from the hospital and from coroners in the area. The former are the most likely sources of hepatitis, especially those from renal dialysis and transplantation units. As a general rule, it is wise to regard all transplant cases and every jaundiced body with suspicion. Requests for necropsy often arrive without clinical notes and with no notification whether the patient was Australia antigen-positive or not. This defect in communication is one of the major hazards in a large, busy hospital.
All bodies should be handled with gloves both before and after the necropsy. Blood leaks may occur on both occasions and may cause infection with the agent.
